Industrial policy, particularly through the provision of large-scale assistance to industry in the form of 'tax holidays' and subsidies to firms, is very important in China. A major contribution of this paper is to introduce firm-level measures of assistance directly into industry-level production functions determining firm output using Chinese firm-level panel data for 1998-2007 and analyse impact of government assistance on TFP at the firm-level. Our results indicate inverted U-shaped gains from assistance: across the 26 industries considered, firms receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 9.4%, 9.2% and -3% gains in TFP level, respectively. We then decompose the growth of TFP and relate it to assistance and formal political connections between firms and the government. We find in general firms receiving assistance contributed relatively more to TFP growth than non-assisted firms. However, this was largely through new firms being 'encouraged' to start-up rather than through firms open throughout 1998 to 2007 improving. There is also evidence that closure rates were truncated as a result of assistance. Moreover, the better results for assisted firms was very much 'driven' by a sub-group that received assistance but had no formal political connections and were not State-owned.
Introduction
Providing assistance to industry as part of an industrial strategy has a long history, in both developing and developed economies (Schwartz and Clements, 1999) . Until more recently, such approaches were presumed to have been largely a failure, summed-up by Cohen (2006, p. 88) as follows:
"The standard criticism levelled against sectoral industrial policies is that the state has neither the necessary information nor adequate incentives to make better choices than the market… it tends to misestimate … the negative long-term effects of the protection granted to certain firms and the negative impacts of the benefits granted to promoted sectors on other sectors."
However, industrial policy is generally now regarded more favourably as shown by various contributions to recent books on the topic (e.g., Felipe, 2015; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013) . Rather than just 'believe' in the market and allow economic success to be generated by globalisation allied to government intervention in support of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, "… it has become obvious that all governments are engaged in various forms of industrial policies… (therefore) the question is not whether any government should use industrial policy but rather how to use industrial policy in the best way" (Stiglitz et. al. 2013, pp. 5-6) .
China is perceived as a country that provides large-scale assistance to industry (Haley and Haley, 2013) . But was government assistance targeted at the right firms and sectors and at an appropriate level? A recent paper by Aghion et. al. (2015) investigated if the distribution of government assistance to firms in China enhanced productivity, finding that assistance was allocated to competitive sectors and /or fostered competition in a sector 1 so enhancing productivity growth over the 1998-2007 period.
Their approach was essentially to test if subsidies were correlated with initial competition levels, where the latter was measured using a Lerner index. They also measured the concentration of assistance across firms within each sector (using a Herfindahl index). Both the correlations obtained at the sector-city level (the Lerner indices) and the Herfindahl indices were regressed on firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) estimates obtained using an Olley-Pakes approach. Both measures were found to have positive and significant impacts on TFP, and this is taken as evidence that government assistance was targeted at the right firms and sectors.
However, Aghion et. al. (op. cit.) did not test directly whether receiving assistance had a direct impact on each firms' TFP nor the extent of such assistance; if receiving assistance is found to lower firm-level TFP (at least for some categories of firms or at, say, high levels of assistance) then it may well be that overall industrial policy in China introduces distortions that increase misallocation and work against the productivity-enhancing effects associated with the (more macro-level) distribution of assistance. Whether assistance acts as a boost to investment and production, while at the same time underpinning productivity growth, is largely an empirical issue. Thus a major contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature, by introducing variables that measure the assistance (including tax 'holidays' and subsidies) received by each firm directly into production functions determining firm output and analysing the impact of the assistance on TFP at the firm-level. A system-GMM econometric approach is used to measure firm-level TFP (with the variables representing assistance instrumented by their lagged values). To check the robustness of our results, the impact of assistance is also tested using a production function approach based on 'matching' firms receiving assistance with those not receiving 'treatment' who nonetheless had very similar characteristics to the assisted sub-group (Imbens and Rubin, 2015) . Both sets of results indicate that across the 26 industries considered Chinese firms that received assistance had higher TFP during 1998-2007, although there is some evidence that too high a level of assistance has negative consequences for TFP, suggesting that 'rent-seeking' and/or the pursuit of profit is blunted when firms become too dependent on government help, especially when such help is tied to 'political control' by the state (which is the case in China as explained below). To justify such results, we provide a simple model in the appendix that sets out how this is consistent with economic theory.
Apart from the Aghion et. al. (2015) study, we are only aware of a study by Girma et. al. (2009) who used the same database as we use (but only for 1999 to 2005) to consider whether subsidies boosted export sales for domestic firms in manufacturing (finding subsidies stimulated exporting intensities of existing exporters but had little impact on encouraging firms to enter exporting). The major differences with the current study are: we include all (and not just domestic) firms in manufacturing and utilities covering 1998-2007; the more important form of assistance provided through 'tax holidays' (as well as subsidies) is included; and our dependent variable is TFP. Other studies, mostly covering developed economies, that consider the impact of assistance on productivity are relatively scarce, usually relate only to labour productivity (not TFP) and have produced mixed results. For example, Irwin and Klenow (1996) found no impact on labour productivity of R&D subsidies for U.S. high-tech companies; for Japanese forestry, Managi (2010) found a negative relationship between subsidies and TFP; Einio (2014) reports no instantaneous impacts of R&D support programmes in Finland on productivity (although there is evidence of long-term gains);
Huang (2015) shows that tax credit use among Taiwanese firms enhanced their productivity; while Koski and Pajarinen (2015) report that R&D subsidies had no statistically significant impact on labour productivity in Finnish firms during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , although employment subsidies and other subsidies (the latter covering similar State aid instruments as included in the present study) were negatively related to output-per-worker.
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The paper is set out as follows. In the next section we discuss the rationale for the (Chinese) government providing assistance to firms, where government aid can be central, state or local (or some combination of all three levels). In Section 3 we discuss briefly the form that assistance takes and present some background information on its importance to firms. Following this, we estimate industry-level production functions using system-GMM and a 'matching' approach, to test whether assistance impacted on the level of TFP across firms. In section 5 we decompose the growth of TFP and relate it to assistance and the extent of formal political connections between firms and the 2 Karhunen and Huovari (2015), using similar data, confirm these results for Finland.
government. The paper concludes with a summary and some ideas for further research that would extend the approach taken in this paper.
The rationale for government assistance to firms
The starting (traditional neoclassical) position is usually that markets are efficient such that they are the best mechanism by which to allocate resources (cf. the model of general equilibrium associated with Arrow and Debreu, 1954) ; the exception is when there are market failures (European Commission, 2002) . Traditionally such failures have been associated with imperfect and asymmetric information being available to (especially smaller) firms, and/or imperfect (risk) markets leading to higher (financial) costs for by such firms and more generally a problem of incomplete markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) . Failures are also associated with not being able to capture positive externalities in other firms -such as R&D spillovers -or the wider benefits gained from geographic agglomeration (e.g., intra-industry specialization through Marshall-Arrow-Romer economies and/or inter-industry Jacobian urbanization economies 3 ).
6 will close the "knowledge" gap that exists with firms at the (international) frontier, so moving resources from low-to high-productivity sectors (it is argued -see Felipe, 2015 -that such sectors do not develop naturally in developing economies without government help). Thus, for example, Khan (2015) sets out a model of the 'competitiveness curve' that justifies assistance to industry (particularly in developing economies) based on providing 'rents for learning' to cover knowledge and capability gaps and encourage learning-by-doing. In developing economies like China, firms initially lack the sophisticated organisations and technical capabilities to produce goods and services at global quality standards (and costs), and assistance buys time to engage in the learning that is needed, as well as encouraging inward foreign direct investment from firms that have the required competencies (which should also lead to additional spillover effects).
In China, there is an additional rationale for government providing (large-scale) assistance to firms; in principle all firms in China are subject to political control -i.e., there is a lishu 6 relationship, which means firms are "subordinate to" political influence. In practice the lishu relationship includes "… approvals for licences, domain, major projects, major operations decisions (such as profit distribution and investment) and firm structures" (Tan et. al., 2007, p. 788) , all of which are set to meet political objectives. As well as controls, the lishu relationship also involves government support and subsidies (e.g., access to finance, more favourable tax treatment, granting of contracts, access to raw materials and other 'scarce resources' 7 , etc.). The relationship is much stronger for publicly owned firms (e.g., state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, and collectively owned enterprises), who are also expected to meet certain 'social' goals set by politicians, such as employment targets, but it is still relevant to privately-owned and foreign-owned firms (either because of the strength of political connections and/or because of intervention by government). 8 However, Xia et. al. (2009) state that 6 The Chinese name for this relationship, as represented in the National Bureau of Statistics database we use below, is 隶属关系. 7 Closer ties to government can also help businesses to overcome market and state failures in securing property rights and enforcing contracts -Li et. al., (2008) and Zhou (2013) . Note, therefore, this definition of politically connected firms is different to the approach adopted by Faccio (2006) , who looked at such connections across 47 countries (excluding China). 8 An essential difference in the lishu relationship between publicly-controlled and privately-owned firms tends to be that the former are more beset with meeting policy goals (e.g., employment) rather than receiving favourable treatment such as subsidies and/or access to finance (Wu et. al., 2012 528-29) comments that "China's national budget is a nested hierarchy of independent budgets -each government unit exercises property rights over firms under their financial jurisdiction… each of which seeks to expand its revenues by capturing investment, subsidies, and grants". Haley and Haley (op. cit. p. 21) review the case study evidence that shows "provincial governments deploy massive 9 Haley and Haely (op. cit, note that "in China political factors matter at least as much as, and often more than, economic factors for firms' and markets' performance and therefore for the dispensation of subsidies". They also argue -based on case studies -that there is substantial evidence that Chinese production subsidies have encouraged many overseas (and especially U.S.) firms to move manufacturing to China, after developing their technological competencies in their home countries.
subsidies to support favoured business groups and further provincial rather than central objectives or efficiencies".
Thus while Chinese policymakers in the period after the 'open door' reforms starting in 1992 sought to learn from how Korea and Japan achieved large-scale development, which included lessons in subsidising strategic industries, there is evidence (Heilmann and Shih, 2013 ) that full-scale assistance to firms (and industrial policy more generally) only really got going in the 1990's once
Chinese policymakers had concluded that by supporting targeted firms they could advance the state's interests in the new economic order (Thun, 2004) . Historically, such help had been limited to Stateowned Enterprises (SOEs), but since the 1990's this has been extended to privately-owned firms as well.
In terms of the type of assistance usually given to firms, this tends to be based on 'horizontal'
(covering activities that take place in a broad range of sectors and typically affecting the 'infrastructure' surrounding firms) and 'vertical' (more targeted on specific firms and sectors)
policies. The former has in more recent times received greater support as it is seen to have a smaller impact on competition (since it is not about 'picking winners' as all firms should face a 'level playing field'), whereas vertical policies can favour one (sub-group) of firms to the detriment of others. That said, even horizontal policies impact more on certain firms (e.g., those more engaged in R&D, or located in sectors with attributes that are being encouraged by policy, such as higher value-added). In Based on the discussion in this section, and in anticipation of the results presented below, we provide a simple theoretical model in the appendix where generally assistance lowers the 'user' cost of capital, so relaxing likely financial constraints and allowing firms to upgrade the quality of their capital stock, which in turn will lead to increases in TFP (e.g., through lowering costs as 'vintage' capital stock is replaced by more efficient, newer capital equipment; and/or through allowing firms to introduce new, higher quality products). The model also allows for managerial effort to be divided between pursuing higher levels of TFP and rent-seeking (e.g., through lishu relationships), where the latter (cet. par.) increases profitability (without increasing TFP) and thus boosts the personal reward to managers (e.g., when assistance 'leaks' into higher profits, through such 'soft budget' constraints, managers obtain greater bonus-related pay 11 and this creates an agency problem -see, for example, Hanke and Heine, 2015) . The outcome is that we are able to show that up to a certain assistance rate (which we denote in the model as ̂) managerial effort is dominated by efforts to improve TFP; however, when actual government assistance becomes too high ( >̂) this dulls the pursuit of higher TFP as 'rent seeking' dominates managerial efforts.
11 Or when corruption is present, it may be possible for them to use the extra profits to reward themselves more directly. in Ding et. al. (2015) . This dataset includes all SOEs and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $817,000) or more. Brandt et al. (2012.) provide a thorough discussion of this dataset, which for present purposes covered nearly 600 thousand firms, which corresponds to some 2.2 million firm-year observations. 13 The value attributed to any profits tax holiday is computed as: (0.33  profits-before-tax)  profits tax paid. The value of any VAT holiday is (0.17  value-added)  VAT paid. Du et. al. (2014 ), Harrison (2014 and Aghion et. al. (2015) provide further details. 14 Others (e.g., Aghion et. al., 2015) have also included the 'implied' rate of interest firms paid on loans (calculated as interest payments divided by current liabilities) to measure the extent to which firms may have received loans at belowmarket interest rates. Certainly the implied interest across firms did decline between 1998 and 2004 (before rising again between 2004 and 2007) -see Figure U .1 in the unpublished appendix. However, the percentage of firms paying zero interest, because they had no borrowings, also rose dramatically from around 29% in 1998 to around 42% in 2007 (mostly due to the growth in importance of smaller privately-owned businesses during this period -see Table 1 in Ding et. al. (2015) -who were generally unable to secure loans from the Chinese banking system). Given this, no direct measure of the 'implied' cost of borrowing is included in this study (although, note, we do include measures on firm liquidity into our determinants of TFP -see Table 3 below).
declined with the average tariff rate declining from some 18% to 10% (see Table 24 .1 in Harrison, 2014, for details on tariff rates across industries 15 ). Table 3 around here
The direct impact of assistance on firm level productivity
In this section we present the empirical findings on the relationship between the rate of government assistance received and TFP. The methodology (and justification for its use 18 ) has been fully set out in in Ding et. al. (2015) , where a system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) approach was used to estimate log-linear Cobb-Douglas gross-output production functions for 26 industries in 15 Table U .3 in the unpublished appendix provides the breakdown used in this study. 16 That is, not the average across firms -totals for each sub-group were instead used. 17 Table U .4 in the unpublished appendix provides a breakdown of assistance rates across ownership sub-groups by type of assistance. It is also important to note that while SOEs had lower rates of assistance, the NBS data shows that in 1998 SOEs received nearly 39% of all assistance by value (¥64.6 of a total of ¥167.4 billion); in 2007 they received just over 14% of all assistance (¥207.9 of a total of ¥1,453.2 billion). 18 Such as the need to use a fixed-effects estimator; the strengths of the approach versus the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approaches; the need to estimate a gross-output versus value-added production function; and the consistency of estimating TFP using a single-stage (rather than multi-stage) approach.
China, using annual firm-level National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data for 1998-2007. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
where endogenous , , and refer respectively to the logarithms of real gross output, employment, intermediate inputs, and the capital stock in firm at time ( = 1, … , ; = 1, … );
and is a vector of observed (proxy) variables determining TFP. In particular we include dummy variables measuring the rate of assistance received (compared to the benchmark sub-group who received no assistance); also included into the vector are firm characteristics such as firm age, political affiliation, firm ownership, export behavior, whether the firm engaged in R&D, financial variables, and geographic location ( Table 3 provides a list of the variables used; further discussion is provided in Ding et. al., op. cit., relating to their Table 1 ). Lastly, is a time trend, measuring exogenous gains in TFP over time.
Equation (1) -in dynamic form with additional lagged values of output and factor inputs -is estimated using the two-step XTABOND2 system GMM approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991) implemented in STATA (this also involves correcting for any potential finite sample bias using Windmeijer's, 2005, approach) . Thus equation (1) is estimated both in first-differences and in levels, allowing for fixed effects and tackling endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables (including the lagged dependent variable) and selection bias by using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments in the first differences equation, and first-differences of the same variables as instruments in the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 19 . In this study, gross output, intermediate inputs,
labour, and capital are treated as endogenous, as well as assistance rates, political affiliation, capital ownership, 20 exporting, and R&D. Lastly, according to Arellano and Bond (1991) , the presence of second-order autocorrelation implies that the estimates are inconsistent. Panel tests for autocorrelation are used to establish whether second-order correlation is an issue. Table 4 around here
The detailed results from estimating equation (1) for 26 two-digit industries/industry groups are presented in Table U .2 (in the unpublished appendix). These are very similar to those presented in Ding et. al. (2015) , to which the interested reader is directed for a full discussion. Here we concentrate on the parameter estimates for the assistance variables (Table 4 , top half). Firstly, as the diagnostics show, the models estimated pass various tests of the validity of the instruments used and tests for autocorrelation. All the models for the 26 industries pass the Hansen test for overidentification at the 10% level or better, suggesting the validity of the instrument set used. With regard to tests for autocorrelation, none show evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals (based on a 10% significance level), suggesting the overall consistency of our estimates. Table 4 shows that in 11 out of 26 industries the impact of assistance on TFP increases monotonically for those firms that receive less than 10%, 10-19% and 20-49% assistant rates; for a further 10 industries assistance rates between 1-9% have a significantly positive effect while the impact is greater for those in receipt of 10-19% assistance rates, and approximately the same for those receiving 20-49% compared to 10-19% assistance. Only for the petroleum sector, measuring instruments, electronic power generation and gas production is there a decline in the positive impact of assistance on TFP for the 20-49% sub-group compared to 10-19%. Tobacco is the only sector where assistance (for any sub-group) has no statistically significant impact on TFP. In 9 industries firms with assistance rates 50+% experienced significant declines in TFP (especially coal mining, electronic power generation and water production), while in nonmetal products receiving 50+% assistance boosted TFP by 5.7% and in metal products the impact was 13.7% higher TFP (only in the latter sector does TFP increases monotonically across all assistance rate sub-groups).
scope of this paper) could structural parameters be retrieved and direct causal relationships be separated out. Instead here we can identify the reduced form impact of a change in assistance on TFP, based on an unbiased parameter estimates, given we instrument endogenous variables.
On average across all 26 industries, the parameter estimates in Table 4 show that firms receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 9.4%, 9.2% and -3% gains in TFP, respectively. 21 This complements the result obtained by Aghion et. al. (2015) that "… driving the Herfindahl for the dispersion of tax holidays on income taxes and valueadded taxes to 0 would lead to an increase in TFP of 8.5 to 10.3 percentage points" (pp. 15-16). Thus both studies show that assistance to industry in China has a direct and an indirect impact on firmlevel TFP.
Based on the results from estimating equation (1), we can also calculate an index of TFP using:
and use equation (2) to summarise our results. Figure 1 , which shows the cumulative distribution of TFP for firms with different rates of assistance, confirms that assisted firms generally had higher TFP, with a gap between the best and worst performing sub-groups of 0.133 at the widest point.
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Lastly, even though in estimating equation (1) we allow for fixed effects, and endogeneity and selection bias for certain key right-hand-side variables (via instrumenting intermediate inputs,
labour, capital, assistance rates, political affiliation, capital ownership, exporting, and R&D), we also as a check re-estimated equation (1) using a 'matched' sample approach (Imbens and Rubin, 2015) .
Separately for each of the 26 industries covered here we used a propensity-score approach to predict the likelihood of receiving assistance and then used one-to-one 'matching' to create an overlapping 'treatment' and 'control' group of firms (the STATA procedure PSMATCH2 was used). 24 This 21 This is based on taking a simple average across all industries (irrespective of whether parameter estimates were statistically significant or not) and expressing the results as ∑ − 1. 22 Note, ̂= −̂−̂−̂ is not a proper TFP index, because the measure of input growth (̂− −̂) does not satisfy axiom X5 (proportionality) in O'Donnell (2015) , except in the case of constant returns-to-scale. The solution is to restore proportionality by using a special case of the Fare-Primont (1995) input index (i.e., equation 2 above). 23 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions between the 20-<50% and 50+% distributions has a d-statistic of 0.133 (and associated p-value of 0.00). 24 The equation used for the propensity score matching was
smaller sample was then used to re-estimate equation (1) -using system-GMM but this time not instrumenting assistance rates -with the key results reported in Table 5 (lower half). Tests of the appropriateness of the 'matching' technique (using PSTEST in STATA) based on Rubin's B and R
show that the 'treatment' and 'control' groups are sufficiently balanced. Moreover, the results obtained with respect to the parameter estimates attached to the assistance rate dummies are generally similar; the averages across all industries of the impact of assistance on TFP for the various subgroups are less than 10 percentage points different when the 'full' data and 'matched' data results are compared. This confirms that the estimates produced in Table 4 (top half) of the impact of assistance on TFP are indeed robust.
TFP growth and the impact of assistance
The previous section shows the impact of receiving assistance on the level of TFP, while this section takes the next step: we decompose the growth of aggregate TFP and consider the contribution of government assistance. That is, while in section 4 we have found that assistance generally leads to higher levels of TFP, evidence is still needed as to whether government aid induces higher aggregate TFP growth -where the latter includes firms in operation throughout 1998-2007 (covering withinfirm and inter-firm changes to TFP) as well as the impact of new firm entry and firm closures. Put differently, TFP growth is not just about changes in the distribution of the TFP level across firms, but also the (re-)allocation of resources across firms as they expand or contract.
We measure TFP growth and its decomposition using the well-known Haltiwanger approach (Foster et. al., 1998) . The index of productivity in year is defined as a geometrically weighted average of individual firm-level productivities (equation 2). This index and its growth between and − can therefore be written as follows:
25 where comprises a sets of control variables determining the probability of being assisted (involving the indicated variables in Table 3 , including industry and year dummies). 25 As will be seen, we combine the between-firm and cross-firm effects into one 'between firm' effect.
where measures productivity and is the share of output for firm in period . Thus, productivity growth can be expressed as follows:
Using estimates of for 1998 and 2007 (equation 2) and equations (4) and (5), we obtain the results in Table 5 . The latter shows that overall Chinese firms achieve on average TFP growth of 7.9% p.a., with 80% 26 of this attributable to the impact of new firm entry (firm closure actually decreased TFP growth by 0.3% p.a.). The next major source was from continuing firms becoming internally more productive (contributing 21% of overall growth 27 ). Table 5 around here (over 42%), and in part reflects their having lower TFP levels. Much of the contribution to SOE TFP growth was due to the closure of inefficient firms (contributing 62% 29 of total TFP growth). Similarly, Table 5 shows that firms that had strong political connections (i.e., lishu relationships with provincial or central government) also contributed much less to overall TFP growth, which is in line with the results for SOE's (see Wu et. al., 2012) .
Importantly, 1998, contributed just over 25% of overall TFP growth and thus in aggregate the assisted group contributed around 75% of total TFP growth). Further, taking account of their share of output and hence relative importance in 1998, 30 all the assisted sub-groups performed better than the non-assisted group, reflecting both stronger improvements in TFP over time and larger increases in their shares of total output. 31 The entry of more productive and the closure of less productive firms dominated the composition of TFP growth in non-assisted firms (accounting for 44% and 33% of overall growth, respectively), and there was also a significant contribution from 'within-firm' improvements in productivity. Overall, this is in line with what might be expected when no government incentives are received and firms face the full impact of market competition. For the assisted sub-groups, there is much less reliance on the closure of less productive firms as a means of improving TFP growth (contributions were either small or negative) which suggests that assistance may have helped to 'propup' a proportion of relatively unproductive firms. There is also little evidence to suggest that assisted firms overall experienced higher 'with-firm' productivity gains, relative to non-assisted firms.
Instead, the major source of TFP improvement for assisted firms tended to be the opening of new firms, perhaps in part attracted (facilitated) by the subsidies available from government.
Lastly, we present results when firms are grouped by whether they were State-owned, had any political connections, and received assistance (at any positive rate). Part of the reason for grouping the data in this way is that during the period covered the proportion of output attributed to firms with no political connections increased from 12.9% in 1998 to over 55% by 2007 (Table 5) .
And yet Table 3 shows that on average between 1998-2007 nearly 57% of firms receiving assistance had no formal political connections. This provides strong support for the claim made by Haley and Haley (2013, Chapter 1) that under the operation of Chinese State Capitalism, the government has 30 Recall the figures in Column 1 (Table 5 ) reflect two components, as shown in Equation (4): a within-subgroup productivity change and the relative importance of the subgroup over time. That is, we can rewrite Equation (4) as: Table 5 the TFP index for firms with a 50+% assistance rate is higher than the TFP indices for non-assisted (and <10% assisted) firms. In Figure 1 , the average TFP of the 50+% sub-group is about the same (or lower). The difference is due to TFP not being weighted by output shares in Figure 1 .
become less reliant on formal, traditional lishu relationships and instead ensures firms are dependent on government for financial assistance that creates mutual dependence. Table 6 around here Table 6 shows that firms receiving government financial assistance that had no formal political connections and were not State-owned had (by some margin) the best performance: this subgroup contributed nearly 59% to overall TFP growth, with the highest TFP levels in both 1998 and 2007, and the largest increase in market share (up from 8% to nearly 45%). In this sub-group, some 97% of TFP growth was due to the entry of new firms. Next, in terms of the contribution to aggregate TFP growth, comprised firms receiving no assistance, and as stated above net entry and, to a lesser extent, 'within-firm' improvements had the largest impact on productivity growth.
In contrast, firms that received assistance and were either SOE's (with no formal political links) or had political connections (but were not SOE's) -the 'remainder' sub-group -contributed the least to TFP growth, despite their having some 26% of total output in 1998 (which only fell to 23% by 2007). For this sub-group, there were significant, but counter-balancing contributions to TFP growth from positive 'within-firm' improvements and the entry of more productive firms, and even larger negative impacts through the closure of more productive firms. The final sub-group (assisted SOE's with political connections) contributed some 9% to overall TFP growth, but they had the lowest TFP levels in both years and lost around 50% of their market share over the period. This subgroup saw little improvement in TFP growth through the 'within-firm' contribution, although there were significant gains through the most productive 'continuing' firms gaining market shares at the expense of the least productive firms ('between-firm' effects).
Summary and conclusions
Industrial policy, particularly through the provision of large-scale assistance to industry in the form of 'tax holidays' and subsidies to firms, is very important in China (e.g., the data used here for medium-to large-sized firms in manufacturing and utilities shows that in 2007 over 72% of firms received government assistance, worth around 13% of their value-added). Recently Aghion et. al. (2015) have reported that the distribution of government assistance to firms in China has enhanced productivity over the 1998-2007 period, given that it was allocated to competitive sectors and /or fostered competition in a sector. However, they did not test directly whether receiving assistance had a direct impact on each firms' TFP, perhaps thereby introducing distortions that work against the productivity-enhancing effects associated with the distribution of assistance.
A major contribution of this paper has been to use Chinese firm-level panel data for [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] to introduce measures of assistance received by each firm directly into industry-level production functions determining firm output. The latter were estimated using a system-GMM econometric approach (with assistance instrumented by its lagged valued); and by estimating production functions using 'matched' data comprising firms receiving assistance and firms not receiving 'treatment' who nonetheless had very similar characteristics to the assisted sub-group. The results indicated that, across the 26 industries considered, Chinese firms that received assistance had higher TFP during 1998-2007, although there is some evidence that too high a level of assistance has negative consequences for TFP. On average the results showed that firms receiving assistance rates of 1-10%, 10-19%, 20-49% and 50+% experienced on average 4.5%, 9.4%, 9.2% and -3% gains in TFP, respectively.
While we find that government assistance generally boosted TFP at the firm level, we also show that aggregate TFP growth was largely achieved through assisted new firms being 'encouraged' to start-up rather than through continuing firms improving, and there is also some evidence that closure rates were truncated as a result of government assistance. That said, overall assisted firms did contribute more to TFP growth than non-assisted firms, but this was very much 'driven' by a subgroup that received government financial assistance but had no formal political connections and were not State-owned. Assisted firms that were SOE's and/or had political connections were the lowest performers, which suggests that state policy to boost TFP worked best in China when it was decoupled from formal political control. 
Appendix
For simplicity, the firm employs a Cobb-Douglas function:
where Y, E, M and K refer to output, employment, intermediate inputs and capital stock; ω is the physical productivity of the firm, and we assume constant return to scale so + + = 1. With imperfect competition, demand is:
and we assume the elasticity of demand is η < −1; P is the price of the product; and f(x) is the quality of the product which is a function of the managerial effort x. We assume f(x) is increasing in x.
Factor prices are PE, PM, and PK(γ) and in particular, the 'user' cost of capital PK(γ) is a function of government assistance γ (with < 0).
The firm maximises profit, subjective to the production function (A.1) and the demand curve (A.2):
After some manipulation, the profit function can be shown to be:
where
+1 , which does not involve x or γ.
As well as managerial effort to boost product quality, managers can also exert rent-seeking effort q:
where g(q), the share of government assistance that directly rewards management, is increasing in rent-seeking effort q. Assuming that the nominal salary of managers is a share β of firm profit, we can write the problem of the manager as: .6) subject to the constraint that total effort (x + q) = 1. This imposes a trade-off for the manager of allocating her effort between pursuing TFP (hence higher profit) and pursuing rent-seeking to boost her private rewards without having to make the effort of boosting TFP.
To simplify the solution of the problem (and without loss of generality), we set f(x) = x and g(q) = −1 , and ( ) = − ̅ where ̅ = 1 is the normalised market 'user' cost of capital. Thus, the first order condition of the manager's problem is
where the first term measures the marginal return to managerial effort from firm profit that determines nominal salary, while the second term represents the marginal return of managerial effort from rentseeking. The former is positive while the latter is negative (as she has less rent-seeking effort to spend the more profit-seeking effort is allocated). The trade-off between the two implies optimal managerial effort is:
Note that * ( ) is a concave function of , with a maximum at * = −1
. 33 Also, measured TFP is:
As < −1, measured TFP is higher if physical productivity is higher. More importantly, assistance generally increase TFP except when assistance is too high. This is summarized in the following proposition. That is, government subsidies lower the marginal cost of production and provide an incentive to the manager to allocate more effort to pursue higher profitability (via higher TFP), but over-assistance induces the manager to substitute managerial effort by rent-seeking effort, and consequently lowers TFP. 33 Note that < −1, so * > 0. We assume > −1
, so * < 1. Thus, the optimal effort is an interior solution. a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities. Source: NBS data b Each firm was assigned to the ownership sub-group which had 50+% of its share capital. When no sub-group had 50+% then the sub-group with the largest percentage share was used. Table U .2 (unpublished appendix). z-statistics in italics and parenthesis. ***/**/* significant at 1/5/10% level. a ' matched' sample comprising treatment and control group obtained using propensity score matching for each industry. Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced. a Those firms where proportion of capital owned by state >=50% (for firms with <50% share ownership in a particularly category, they were assigned to the largest ownership sub-group) b Those firms reporting lishu links with local governments (e.g., city, district, county, prefecture, township and village). c Those firms reporting lishu links with government at province or central government level. d Assistance rate equals 100  value of grants and tax holidays by total value-added produced Table U .2: Long-run two-step system-GMM production function (26 industries, China, 1998 (26 industries, China, -2007 z-statistics in italics and parenthesis. ***/**/* significant at 1/5/10% level. a ' matched' sample comprising treatment and control group obtained using propensity score matching for each industry. Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced. a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities. Source: NBS data b Each firm was assigned to the ownership sub-group which had 50+% of its share capital. When no sub-group had 50+% then the sub-group with the largest percentage share was used. 
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